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ABSTRACT Cyber Supply Chain (CSC) system is complex which involves different sub-systems perform-
ing various tasks. Security in supply chain is challenging due to the inherent vulnerabilities and threats
from any part of the system which can be exploited at any point within the supply chain. This can cause
a severe disruption on the overall business continuity. Therefore, it is paramount important to understand
and predicate the threats so that organization can undertake necessary control measures for the supply
chain security. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) provides an intelligence analysis to discover unknown to
known threats using various properties including threat actor skill and motivation, Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedure (TT and P), and Indicator of Compromise (IoC). This paper aims to analyse and predicate
threats to improve cyber supply chain security. We have applied Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) with
Machine Learning (ML) techniques to analyse and predict the threats based on the CTI properties. That
allows to identify the inherent CSC vulnerabilities so that appropriate control actions can be undertaken
for the overall cybersecurity improvement. To demonstrate the applicability of our approach, CTI data is
gathered and a number of ML algorithms, i.e., Logistic Regression (LG), Support Vector Machine (SVM),
Random Forest (RF), and Decision Tree (DT), are used to develop predictive analytics using the Microsoft
Malware Prediction dataset. The experiment considers attack and TTP as input parameters and vulnerabilities
and Indicators of compromise (IoC) as output parameters. The results relating to the prediction reveal
that Spyware/Ransomware and spear phishing are the most predictable threats in CSC. We have also
recommended relevant controls to tackle these threats. We advocate using CTI data for the ML predicate
model for the overall CSC cyber security improvement.
INDEX TERMS Cyber threat intelligence, machine learning, cyber supply chain, predictive analytic, cyber
security, tactic techniques procedures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber Supply Chain (CSC) security is critical for reliable
service delivery and ensure overall business continuity of
Smart CPS. CSC systems by its inherently is complex and
vulnerabilities within CSC system environment can cascade
from a source node to a number of target nodes of the overall
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Po Yang .
cyber physical system (CPS). A recent NCSC report high-
lights a list of CSC attacks by exploiting vulnerabilities that
exist within the systems [1]. Organizations outsource part of
their business and data to the third-party service providers that
could lead any potential threat. There are several examples
for successful CSC attacks. For instance, Dragonfly, a Cyber
Espionage group, is well known for targeting CSC organiza-
tion [2], [3]. The Saudi Aramco power station attack halted
its operation due to a massive cyberattack [1]. There are
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existing works that consider CSC threats and risks but a lack
of focus on threat intelligence properties for the overall cyber
security improvement. Further, it is also essential to predict
the cyberattack trends so that the organization can take the
timely decision for its countermeasure. Predictive analytics
not only provide an understanding of the TTPs, motives and
intents of the threat actors but also assist situational awareness
of current supply system vulnerabilities.
This paper aims to improve the cybersecurity of CSC
by specifically focusing on integrating Cyber Threat Intelli-
gence (CTI) and Machine Learning (ML) techniques to pred-
icate cyberattack patterns on CSC systems and recommend
suitable controls to tackle the attacks. The novelty of our work
is threefold:
• Firstly, we consider Cyber Threat Intelligence(CTI) for
systematic gathering and analysis of information about
the threat actor and cyber-attack by using various con-
cepts such as threat actor skill, motivation, IoC, TTP and
incidents. The reason for considering CTI is that it pro-
vides evidence-based knowledge relating to the known
attacks. This information is further used to discover
unknown attacks so that threats can be well understood
and mitigated. CTI provides intelligence information
with the aim of preventing attacks as well as shorten time
to discover new attacks.
• Secondly, we applied ML techniques and classifica-
tion algorithms and mapped with the CTI properties to
predict the attacks. We use several classification algo-
rithms such as Logistic Regression (LG), Support Vector
Machine (SVM), Random Forest (RF) and Decision
Tree (DT) for this purpose. We follow CTI properties
such as Indicator of Compromise (IoC) and Tactics,
Techniques and Procedure (TTP) for the attack predi-
cation.
• Finally, we consider widely used cyberattack dataset to
predict the potential attacks [6]. The predication focuses
on determining threats relating to Advance Persistent
Threat (APT), command and control and industrial espi-
onage which are relevant for CSC [7]–[9]. The result
shows the integration of CTI and ML techniques can
effectively be used to predict cyberattacks and identi-
fication of CSC systems vulnerabilities. Furthermore,
our prediction reveals a total accuracy of 85% for the
TPR and FPR. The results also indicate that LG and
SVM produced the highest accuracy in terms of threat
predication.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2
presents an overview of related works including CSC secu-
rity, cyber threat intelligence andMachine Learning for CSC.
Section 3 provides the concepts necessary for the proposed
approach and themeta model. Section 4 provides an overview
of the proposed approach including the integration of CTI and
ML. Section 5 presents the underlying process for the threat
analysis and predication. Section 6 implements the process
for the threat predication using the widely used Microsoft
malware datasets. Section 7 discusses the results and com-
pares the work with the existing works in the literature.
Finally, Section 8 provides conclusion and future direction
of the work.
II. RELATED WORK
There exists several widely used CTI andMLmodels in cyber
security domain. This section presents the existing works that
are relevant with our work.
A. CYBER SUPPLY CHAIN(CSC) SECURITY
The CSC security provides a secure integrated platform for
the inbound and outbound supply chains systems with third
party service provider including suppliers, and distributors
to achieve the organizational goal [10]. Cybersecurity from
supply chain context involves various secure outsourcing of
products and information between third party vendors, and
suppliers [11]. This outsourcing includes the integration of
operational technologies (OT) and Information technologies
(IT) running on Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) infrastruc-
tures. However, there are threats, risks and vulnerabilities
that are inherent in such systems that could be exploited by
threat actors on the operational technologies and information
technologies of the supply inbound and outbound chains
systems. The outbound chain attacks include data manipu-
lations, information tampering, redirecting product delivery
channels, and data theft. The IT risks include those attacks on
the cyber physical and cyber digital system components such
as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, IP address
spoofing, and Software errors [12]. Regarding CSC security,
NIST SP800 [13] proposed a 4 tier framework approach for
improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity that incorpo-
rates the cyber supply chain risk management framework
into it as one of its core components. Tier 1 considers the
organizations CSC risk requirement strategy. Tier 2 consid-
ers the supply chain associated risk identifications including
products and services in the supply inbound and outbound
chains. Tier 3 implementation considers the risk assessments,
threats analyses, associated impacts and determine the base-
line requirements for governance structure. Tier 4 consider
real-time or near-time information to understand supply chain
risk associated with each product and service. However,
the approach and tiers considered risks management but did
not emphasize on ML and threat prediction for future trends
in the CSC domain. Additionally, [14] proposed a supply
chain attack framework and attack patterns that structured
and codifies supply chain attacks. The goal of the framework
was to provide a comprehensive view of supply chain attacks
of malicious insertion across the full acquisition lifecycle to
determine the associated threat and vulnerability information.
B. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE (CTI)
Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) gatherings and analysis have
become one of the relevant actionable intelligences used to
understand both known and unknown threats [4]. The impact
of cyberattacks and emerging threats on CSC systems and
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its devastating effects on business process, data, Intellectual
Property, delivery channel, and cost of recovery has increased
the surge for CTI approach. The CTI process includes iden-
tification, threat analysis and information disseminating to
stakeholders. Considering CTI for cybersecurity, ENISA
in [4] explored the opportunities and limitations of current
threat intelligence platforms by considering CTI implemen-
tation process and threat intelligence programs (TIP) from
strategic, tactical and operational goals. The authors proposed
a threat intelligence program model that collects, normal-
ize, enrich, correlate, analyse and disseminate threat related
information to stakeholders. The strategic CTI goals consider
factors that support executive decisionmakings, tactical goals
consider the CTI process and TIP programs that identifying
intelligence gap and prioritizing them for risk reduction. The
operational goals provide a process that provides an under-
standing of the threat actors motives, modes of operation,
intents, and TTPs and capabilities. However, the processes
do not incorporate ML threat predictions. Additionally, [15]
proposes a threat intelligence-driven security model that con-
siders six CTI phases and processes lifecycle required to
identify intelligence goals. The CTI phases include direction,
collection, process, analysis, dissemination, and feedback.
The author incorporated internal sources such as network
traffic, logs, scans; external sources such as vulnerability
database, threat feeds; and human sources such as the dark
web and social media into themodel for the threat intelligence
modelling. The threat intelligence driven security model
emphasizes on using network traffics, logs and scans and not
ML algorithms for the prediction. Further, [16] develop cyber
threat Intelligence metrics that consider assets, requirement
business operations, adversary, and consumer intelligence
places emphases on value and organizational benefits. The
author’s approach considers four key stages in the threat intel-
ligence process including intelligence requirements, infor-
mation collection, analyses, dissemination, and intelligence
usage. However, the approach does not consider machine
learning for predicting invisible attacks. Furthermore, [17]
proposed a CTI model that operationalizes and analyses
adversarial activities across the lifecycle of an organization
business process to determine actions taken by the attacker.
The author’s approach was based on the organizational intel-
ligence requirements, information gathering, analyses and
disseminate to protect assets for strategic, tactical and oper-
ational understanding and situational awareness. However,
the works emphasized more on attacker motive and intent
and not on ML for the threat predictions. The CTI functional
process is to collectmetrics and trend analysis for the business
risk assessment, prioritization, and decision support with less
emphasis on ML for CSC security.
C. MACHINE LEARNING IN CSC SECURITY
There are several works that consider Machine Learning
classifiers in various cybersecurity application domains such
as spam filters, antivirus and IDS/IPS to predict cyberattack
trends [18], [23], [24]. Considering ML for Security [11],
proposed ML classification of HTTP attacks using a decision
tree algorithm to learn a dataset for performance accuracies
and automatically label a request as valid or attack. The
authors developed a vector space model used commonly for
information retrieval to build a classifier to automatically
label the request as malicious in the URL. The approach
achieved high precision and recall comparatively. However,
the work did not focus on ML and threat prediction in the
CSC environment. Further, [20] carried out the feasibility of
a study on machine learning models for cloud security to test
the models in diverse operation conditions cloud scenarios.
The authors compared Logistic Regression, Decision Tree,
Naïve Bayes, and SVM classification algorithms techniques
to learn a dataset for performance accuracies. The algorithms
represent supervised schemes and are used in network secu-
rity. The result shows an accuracy of 97% in anomalous
packet detections. However, the work did consider CSC secu-
rity from threat prediction in the supply chain environment.
Furthermore, [21] surveyed data mining and ML methods for
cybersecurity detection methods for cyber analytics in sup-
port of intrusion detection in cybersecurity applications. The
authors used Artificial Neural Network, Association rules,
Fuzzy Association rules and Bayesian Networks classifiers
to learn the datasets and provided comparison criteria for the
machine learning and data mining models to recognize the
types of the attack (misuse) and for detection of an attack
(intrusion). However, the techniques and methods used are
not ML models and did not focus on ML and threat predic-
tion in the CSC environment. Additionally, [22] review the
cybersecurity dataset for ML algorithms used for analysing
network traffic and anomaly detection. The author compared
the machine learning techniques used for experiments, eval-
uation methods and baseline classifiers for comparison of the
dataset. The results show significant flaws in some dataset
during feature selection and are not relevant for modern intru-
sion detections datasets. However, the review did not stress
on the current dataset we used from the Microsoft Malware
Threat Prediction website for the prediction. Moreover, [23]
explored the classification of logs using ML techniques on
a decision tree algorithm to learn a dataset that models the
correlation and normalization of security logs. The goal of the
ML techniques is to evaluate if the algorithm can predict the
performance of classification as an attack or not after a train-
ing phase. The dataset used contains anomalous and some
identified attacks. The result shows that the DT algorithm
was model on internet logs to develop a framework for the
normalization and correlation of the classify with an accuracy
of 80%. However, the classification model did not compare
other classification algorithms such as SVM, LR and RF that
are relevant for ML better performance accuracies and threat
analysis.
Another initiative [24] explores the viability of using
machine learning approaches to predict power systems distur-
bance and cyberattack discrimination classifiers and focuses
specifically on detecting cyberattacks where deception is
the core tenet of the event [24]–[30]. The authors in [24]
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evaluated the classification performances on, NNge, OneR,
SVM, RF, JRpper and Adaboost algorithms to learn the
dataset and focused specifically on detecting cyber attacks
where deception is the core tenet of the event. For example,
in [25], the authors proposed a SCADA power system cyber-
attack detection approach by combining a correlation-based
feature selection (CFS) method and K-Nearest-Neighbour
(KNN) instance-based learning (IBL) algorithm. The com-
bination was useful to reduce the extremely large number of
features and to maximize cyberattack detection accuracy with
minimum detection time cost. In [26], an ensemble-learning
model for detecting the cyberattacks of SCADA-based IIoT
platform is proposed. The model was based on the combina-
tion of a random subspace (RS) learning method with random
tree (RT). The authors in [29] proposed a deep-learning,
feature-extraction-based semi-supervised model for cyberat-
tack protection in the trust boundary of IIoT networks. The
proposed approach was adaptive to learn unknown attack.
However, the works did not consider CSC attacks from sup-
plier inbound and outbound chains.
Regarding ML predictive analytics on various datasets,
[28] predicted cybersecurity incidents using ML algorithms
to distinguish between the different types of models. The
authors used text mining methods such as n-gram, bag-
of-words and ML techniques to learn dataset on Naive
Bayes and SVM algorithms for classification performance.
The experiment was to predict classification accuracies of
malware incidents response and actions. The approach did
not consider CTI and ML in the CSC system environment.
Further, [29] proposed a risk teller system that analyses
binary file appearance logs of a machine to predict which
machines are at risk of experiencing malware infection in
advance. The authors used a random forest algorithm and
semi-quantitative methods to build a risk prediction model
that creates a profile to capture usage patterns. The results
associate each level of risk to a machine infection incident
with 95% true positive precision. Besides,[30] characterize
the extent to which cybersecurity incidents can be predicted
based on externally observable properties of an organiza-
tion’s network. The authors usedVerizon’s annual data breach
investigation report to forecast if an organization may suffer
cybersecurity incidents in future. A random forest classifier
was used against over 1000 incident reports taken from vari-
ous datasets. The predictive result achieved an overall accu-
racy of 90% true positives. However, the work did not provide
any inference and map the prediction to existing attacks. All
these works above are important and contributed towards
the improvement of cyber security by using various ML
techniques. However, there is a lack of focus on the overall
CSC security context. A limited works emphasize on threat
intelligence data for the attack predication. For instance, due
to the invisibility nature of cyberattacks, an attack on the CSC
system network node has the potential to cascade to other
nodes on the supply chain system. Therefore, it is necessary
to use ML analytics to predict cyberattacks, threats and the
underlying vulnerabilities. Additionally, there is a need to
understand an organisational context for the threat analysis.
CTI can effectively support to achieve that goal. This work
contributes towards this direction. We have integrated CTI
for threat gathering and analysis with the ML for the threat
prediction so that organizations can determine the suitable
control measure for the overall CSC security improvement.
III. FRAMING CONCEPTS
This section presents the conceptual view of the proposed
approach by combining concepts from both CTI and CSC.
A. CSC THREAT MODELLING CONCEPTS
This section considers the concepts that are necessary to
determine CSC vulnerabilities, goals, requirements, attacks
the cyber supply inbound and outbound chains security and
the CTI domain [2]. Threat modelling provides a systematic
approach to identify and address the possible threats based on
a specific context. It provides an understanding of threat actor
who can attack the system and possible assets which can be
compromised. The proposed approach considers a list of con-
cepts that aid understand the threts and possible mitigation.
The concepts provide a view of the relationships between
organizational and security goal, requirements, threat actors,
attacks, vulnerability, TTPs and indicators of compromise for
understanding of the threat. An overview of the concepts is
given below:
Goal: A goal represents the strategic aim of an organiza-
tion. Properties for the goal include the organizational goal,
the tangible assets required such as infrastructures to achieve
the goal and intangible asset such as credit card information,
health record, and other sensitive data for the security goal.
The organizational goal is the process, product or service that
is carried out. The assets are tangible and intangible assets
including the network infrastructures. The security goal is the
mechanism, configuration, and control put in place to achieve
the goal.
Actor consists of perpetrators, system users, the systems,
the third-party vendors, and companies whose services and
networks systems are attached to the main organization’s
supply chain system. The threat actors are those consist of
users, agents, cybercriminals, and other systems that aims at
compromising the CSC systems and the security goal [8].
The threat actor could be an internal or external attacker.
The CSC system includes the various integrations of network
nodes that make up the supplier chain system. The third-party
vendors include the organization on the supplier inbound
and outbound chains that could be attacked, manipulated,
or compromised.
Inbound and Outbound Supply Chain: In a CSC envi-
ronment, the network nodes and communication channels
are those that integrate with the inbound and outbound
supply chains systems. These are vendors, SMEs, suppli-
ers, and distributors that are on the supply chain. The
inbound suppliers are those with external remote access to
the CSC system. The outbound chains are those that the
organization distributes including individuals, institutions,
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and vendors. The organization can experience attacks on the
supply inbound and outbound chain that supports the appli-
cation processes [8]. The threat actor could initial injection
attacks or insert a redirect script into the vendor’s website
and breach the software developed by the manufacturer that
is used by the organization’s internal employers to distribute
services to vendors and individuals. The goal of the attack
could be to manipulate, alter or divert products and services
after gaining access into the system.
Vulnerabilities: CSC vulnerabilities are the loopholes and
configuration flaws that exist on the supply chain system and
network nodes that could be exploited by an attack, threat
actor or a threat agent. These network vulnerabilities [36]
are those that exist on the supply inbound and outbound
chains including the network nodes, switches, IP addresses,
and firewalls. The vulnerable spots on the CSC system could
be identified from various sources including the software,
the network, website, the user, processes, the application, and
configuration or the third-party vendor. Properties include
asset type, source, node, effect and criticality.
Attack: An attack is any deliberate action or assault on
the supply chain system with the intent to penetrate a system,
to be able to gain access then manipulate and compromise
processes, procedures, and delivery channels of electronic
products, the information flows, and services [2]. Properties
include the type of attack, pattern, prerequisites, and vectors.
We consider attack inputs and outputs parameters for our
study and the attack concepts for our prediction. Inputs of
attack include the tools, capabilities, vectors and knowledge
of the vulnerabilities of the domain to exploit. Outputs of the
attacks are the patterns, access gained by the threat actor,
the methods deployed, TTPs, the loopholes exploited, and
the extent of malware propagation and cascading effects. This
includes those attacks on cyber physical and cyber digital sys-
tems such as hardware, network, IP addresses, and software.
The OT and IT delivery mechanisms could be manipulated
before the product gets to the consumer [8].
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) consist of
the specific adversary behaviour exhibited in an attack [14].
It leverages on resources such as tools, infrastructures, capa-
bilities and personnel. It provides information on the victim’s
target (who, what or where), that are relevant to exploit targets
being targeted, intended effects, kill chain phases, handling
guidance and resources of the TTP information [8], [9].
Threats actors’ mode of operation is to commit attacks such
as Hijacking, social engineering, and footprints, privilege
escalation, and reconnaissance penetrate a supply chain.
CSC Requirement: CSC requirements are the constraints
and security expectations for the system required to support
CSC stakeholders and business needs. The data gathered from
stakeholders inform business processes, system infrastruc-
tures, internal and external user expectations required for
the supply chain system developments and operations [2].
The requirements process and constraints that are gener-
ated during the requirements engineering phase forms the
basis for the system constraints and statements that sup-
port the user and system requirements used to achieve the
organizational goal. The requirements consist of attributes
such as user categories, stakeholders, description, user ID,
acceptance criteria, time constraints, owners and sources. The
requirements concepts include properties such as organiza-
tional requirements, business requirements, system, user, and
operational requirements. The organizational requirements
describe the organizational high-level objectives that must
be performed to achieve the organizational goal. The busi-
ness requirements explain the requirement specifications and
the properties include customer needs and expectations that
must be integrated to meet the system requirements. Systems
requirements demand specific properties of the application,
architecture and the technical requirements need to be able
to describe the features and how the system must function.
These system requirements properties include the constraints,
assumptions and acceptance criteria and the external entities
that will be interacting with the system. They include supply
chain systems processes and constraints that are generated
during the requirements engineering phase that forms the
basis for the system.
Indicators: Indicators are parameters that express an
attack of this type, whether it is imminent, in progress or
has occurred [32]. Properties required to determine the indi-
cators of compromise includes incident type, source, date
& time, impact, motive and intents. The properties are used
to determine threat activities, adversary behaviours, TTPs,
risky events, or state of the incident to determine what could
serve as an indicator of compromise. CSC attack incidents
and course of actions provide intelligence about the nature
of cyberattack indicators and TTPs that can be deployed
on the supply chain especially from the third-party vendor’s
perspective. Indicators convey specific observable patterns
combined with contextual information intended to represent
artefacts and or behaviours of interest within a cybersecurity
context.
Cyber incident report: Cybersecurity incident is defined
as a breach of system security to affect its integrity or avail-
ability. It includes unauthorized access or attempted to access
a system or causing a disruptive event to essential services.
Cybersecurity incident reporting platform provides individ-
uals and organizations with a system to reports cyber inci-
dents they have experienced unexpectedly or any unusual net-
work issues, or suspected fraud or cybercrime activities [31].
Properties for cyber incident reporting include attack type,
date and time of the incident, source of the attack, cause of
an attack, duration, impact on service, impact on staff and
public safety Cyber incident report system is required for
cyber threat analysis and to determine the threat level and
categorizing. It is used to predict cyberattacks and generate
intelligence require to mitigate cyberattacks and for threat
information sharing.
Threat information sharing: Threat information sharing
is used to provide information necessary to assist an orga-
nization in identifying, assessing, monitoring, and respond-
ing to cyber threats [32]. Cyber threat information includes
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indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures used by threat actors, security alerts and threat intel-
ligence reports. It provides findings from the analysis of
cyber incidents and suggests actions to take to prevent cyber-
attacks, detect, protect, contain, and mitigate cyber inci-
dents. Properties for cyber threat information sharing include
information-sharing goals, information sources, scope, shar-
ing community and support. Some rules govern and pro-
tect information sharing, such as information sensitivity and
privacy, sharing designations, and tracking procedures [32].
It provides a basis for an organization to leverage their com-
bined knowledge, information, experience, and competencies
to gain intelligence and understanding of potential threats for
remediation and controls.
Controls: Controls are security mechanisms that are put
in place to secure organizational business operations and
processes. They are security strategies and measures for-
mulated and implemented to ensure that the organizational
goal and objectives are achieved [2], [13]. These controls
include directive, detective, preventive, corrective and recov-
ery. Directive controls aremore strategic and relevant with the
specific supplier inbound and outbound chain requirements.
These are intended to align organizational and security goals
with that of supplier and third-party vendors on the supply
chain and provide guidelines for system usage and processes.
Preventive controls are policies that are put in place for
the technical and physical infrastructures protection. These
are derived from standard measures intended to preclude
actions violating policy or increasing third party risks to
the supply chain system resources. Detective Controls use
supply chain attack indicators to identify practices, processes,
and tools that identify and possibly react to security vio-
lations. These include Firewall, IDS, IPS and the various
configurations required for the supply chain systems. Correc-
tive controls involve physical, administrative, and technical
measures. Recovery controls includes backup plans, regu-
lar updates and contingency planning to ensure integrity or
availability of the CSC in the event of an incident. Once
an incident occurs on the CSC system that results in the
compromise of integrity or availability, the implementation
of recovery controls is necessary to restore the system or
operation to a normal operating state. These include counter-
measures, backups, segmentation, and an incidence response
strategy.
The meta-model in Figure 1 explains relationships among
the concepts. The organizational goal is determined by the
product and services that are produced. The security goal is
to ensure that the supply chain systems that support these
products and services are secured. CSC organization needs
a list of requirements to satisfy for achieve its goals. The
TTP as a CTI properties exploits both inbound and outbound
vulnerabilities for a successful attack. Cyber incident report
provides a detailed about the incident including vulnerability,
indicator and incident time frame. This report needs to share
among the CSC stakeholders. There are controls which are
required to tackle the threats.
IV. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
This section discusses the proposed approach that aims to
improve the CSC security. It includes an integration of
CTI and ML and a systematic process (presented in the
Section 5). Additionally, the underlying concepts of the
proposed approach such as actor, goal, TTP, vulnerability,
incident, and controls, is also mentioned in Section 3. The
approach considers both inbound and outbound chains for
the vulnerability so that CSC organisation can focus on the
possible system flaws. The approach adopts the CTI process
to gather and analyse the threat data and ML techniques to
predicate the threat. ML techniques are used on classification
algorithms to learn a dataset for performance accuracies and
predictive analytics. The rationale for integrating CTI andML
for threat prediction is that the CTI lifecycle process sup-
ports input parameters for detecting known attacks whereas
ML provides output parameters for predicting known and
unknown attacks for future trends.
A. INTEGRATION OF CTI AND ML
The approach combines CTI processes with ML techniques
for cyber threat predictive analytics. The goal is to detect
vulnerabilities and indicators of compromise on CSC net-
work system nodes using known attacks to predict unknown
attacks. We apply the CTI techniques to gather threats
(Known attacks) and ML techniques to learn the dataset to
predicate cyber threats (unknown attacks) on CSC systems.
The inputs are the attacks and TTP that are deployed by
threat actors to compromise a system. The attack feature uses
properties such as attack type, pattern, attack vectors, and
prerequisites to determine the nature of the attack that was
deployed. The TTP consists of attack patterns and attack vec-
tors deployed by the threat actor. The TTP parameter includes
the capabilities of the threat actor and threat indicators. The
threat actor feature uses properties such as user, system and
third-party vendors to determine the vulnerable spots and type
of tools used for the attack to determine the attack pattern.
Tools are the attack weapons or software codes used by the
threat actor for reconnaissance and to initiate an attack. For
instance, the threat actor could use Nmap tool for scanning a
network, Kali Linux tool for penetration and, Metasploit tool
for exploiting loopholes in a network. The output parameters
are the vulnerabilities and indicators of compromise that are
used as threat intelligence. The capability of the threat actor
could be determined by the ability to penetrate a system
and course Advance Persistent threat (APT) attack and take
command and control C&C) the extent of propagation is
used to determine the indicators. Finally, we consider various
controls such as directive, preventive, detective corrective and
recovery required to secure the CSC system.
The rationale for our predictive analytics approach is based
on the premise that the cyberattacks phenomenon includes
a lot of invincibility, and uncertainties and the makes the
threat landscape unpredictable. Similarly, due to the chang-
ing organizational requirements, various integrations, vary-
ing business processes and the various delivery mechanisms,
VOLUME 9, 2021 94323
A. Yeboah-Ofori et al.: Cyber Threat Predictive Analytics for Improving CSC Security
FIGURE 1. Meta-model for the proposed conceptual view of CSC system security.
FIGURE 2. Applying CTI and ML for threat intelligence and predictive analytics.
predicting cyberattacks in the CSC organization context
has been challenging. To achieve that, first, the proposed
approach considers relevant related works and the meta-
model concepts to model the CSC attacks and CTI phases.
For instance, we identify supply inbound and outbound chain
attack indicators and integrate them into CTI phases. Further,
the concepts are analysed using the CTI process lifecycle and
ML techniques to learn the dataset for our prediction. Further-
more, we use the input and output parameters as indicators
for our threat prediction. Finally, the threat prediction results
are evaluated to provide informed intelligence regarding the
various attacks and future threats that are unknown for appro-
priate control mechanisms. Figure 2 indicates the proposed
approach.
V. THREAT ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION PROCESS
This section discusses the overall process for the CSC threat
analysis, prediction, and control in line with the proposed
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approach in Section 3. The process includes four sequential
phases. It follows a methodical approach and a causal pro-
cess for each phase to determine strategy, threat analysis,
threat prediction, and controls. Each phase includes steps
and activities required to achieve the purpose of the phases
as shown in Figure 3. The activities include identifying the
organization’s CSC and security strategy, ML classifications,
infrastructures, attack context, input and output parameters
for our prediction. The activities for the threat analysis phase
include the identification and gathering of threat information,
risk assessment and analysis to determine the threat actor,
threat profile, TTP and IoC. The activities for the threat
prediction phase consider the input parameters for the ML
algorithms, predict threats and for performance evaluation by
using ML techniques to learn datasets. The control activities
include identifying required controls for the CSC systems
including internal and external audits to formulate security
policies and control mechanisms. We expound on the phases
and process further by following the process flow as shown
in Figure 3.
A. PHASE 1: DETERMINE STRATEGY
CSC security strategy combines CTI and cybersecurity
risk strategy including mechanisms, resources and plans
to determine how security goals and controls will be for-
mulated, implemented, and achieved in line with organiza-
tion goal and objectives. It includes identifying, analysing,
reviewing and evaluating organizational assets including
infrastructures, resources and implementation procedures.
CSC security strategy combines, CTI and cybersecurity risk
assessment strategy to gather intelligence and formulate
policies. Strategic, tactical and operational management roles
and responsibilities are recursive and support each other to
ensure security goals are achieved. Strategic management
uses intelligence decision to support plans that determine
security goals and assign responsibility including executive
authorization of blueprints and budget allocation. Tactical
management decision regarding the execution of strategic
management blueprints including security requirements cap-
turing, third party audit, configuration management plans,
uses indicators of compromise to determine controls and
validations. The operational level managers ensure the day-
to-day implementation of the security goals including mon-
itoring, determining TTPs and escalating threat alerts for
remediation and controls. CTI Strategy providesmanagement
evidence-based knowledge gathered about threats actors,
attacks, patterns, vectors, vulnerabilities, TTPs, motives,
intents and capabilities of the adversary. Risk Assessment
Strategy considers the organizational goal and assets and
develops an overall CSC risk strategy that determines the
policies required to guide the organizational business pro-
cesses. It includes risk assessment, CSC requirements captur-
ing and business function. The risk strategy also considered
implementation strategies and procurement policies for OT
and IT acquisitions and integrations of assets.
FIGURE 3. Predictive analytics process.
B. PHASE 2: THREAT ANALYSIS
This threat analysis phase follows the CTI techniques to
determine and analyse the threats of the CSC context.
It requires the CSC strategy information for his purpose and
includes three activities.
Activity 1: Identify and Gather Information
This step identifies all vulnerable spots on the supply
inbound and outbound chains on the meta-model that is used
as indicators for an attack. For instance, in case of a malware
attack, this activity looks for the relevant information such
as the source of the attack, the tools, patterns and the attack
vectors from the analysis of the malware attack that used
as our indicator. To determine the indicators of an attack,
we use threat activities, adversary behaviours, risky events,
or state of the incident to determine what could serve as an
indicator. The indicators may be used to identify any inher-
ent vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a threat actor.
If necessary, the activity carrying out penetration testing,
vulnerability assessment test and threat propagation exercises
to determine the supply inbound and outbound chains on the
OT and IT by following the below stages [2].
Activity 2: Identify and Gather Information
This step identifies all vulnerable spots on the supply
inbound and outbound chains on the meta-model that is used
as indicators for an attack. For instance, in case of a malware
attack, this activity looks for the relevant information such
as the source of the attack, the tools, patterns and the attack
vectors from the analysis of the malware attack that used
as our indicator. To determine the indicators of an attack,
VOLUME 9, 2021 94325
A. Yeboah-Ofori et al.: Cyber Threat Predictive Analytics for Improving CSC Security
we use threat activities, adversary behaviours, risky events,
or state of the incident to determine what could serve as an
indicator. The indicators may be used to identify any inher-
ent vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a threat actor.
If necessary, the activity carrying out penetration testing,
vulnerability assessment test and threat propagation exercises
to determine the supply inbound and outbound chains on the
OT and IT by following the below stages [2].
• Stage 1. Reconnaissance: The threat actor uses APT
methods to gather intelligence and searches the
organization’s websites to gather footprints and identify
vulnerable spots on the network nodes.
• Stage 2. Experiment: The threat actor uses penetration
testing and vulnerability assessment methods various
attack patterns, TTP methods, and tools to explore vul-
nerable spots. The attacks include spear phishing mal-
ware or Remote Access Trojan.
• Stage 3. Exploit: the threat actor initiates attack to gain
access to the system and other resources of the system.
The attack couldmanipulate, alter and redirect deliveries
or initiate and propagate malware.
• Stage 4. Command and Control: The threat actor main-
tains a continuous presence on the system and can
change his password to maintain a presence on the CSC
using advanced persistent threat attack, remote access
command to steal intellectual properties and cause cyber
espionage attacks. Most organizations use automated
password changing system that prompts users to change
their password periodically and that could be exploited
by the threat actor. The threat actor can change the
password and obfuscate in a Command & Control envi-
ronment [2].
Activity 3: Risk Assessments
The risk assessment activity includes the process to mit-
igate CSC risks by determining the probability and impact
of CSC attacks and threats as well as the vulnerable spots
that could be exploited within the cyber supply inbound and
outbound chains and third-party organizations. It identifies all
threats that may pose a risk on the system. Risk assesses the
CSC security domain and analyse risks access spots that are
capture captured. Develop mitigating techniques to control
the risks by identifying risks posed by auditing the third-party
organizations. Classify them based on their service provisions
and levels of integration to the various supply chain network
system.
Activity 4: Analysis
This activity focuses on analysis of the threats to determine
the actual source of the attack, the type of attack, the attack
pattern, the TTP and attack vectors. This will assist to assign
the IoC required and what controls are needed. The threat
analysis techniques include:
• Stage 1. Threat Activity: Determine the nature of attack,
pattern and sources of penetration on the CSC.
• Stage 2: Threat Manipulation: Determines the nature of
cybercrimes committed and the extent of the penetration
to understand the capabilities, motives and intents of the
attacker.
• Stage 3: Threat Impact: Determines the severity of the
attack, malware propagation and the cascading effects
on the supply chain. These determinants influence the
risk factors and the degree of severity of the attacks.
C. PHASE 3: THREAT PREDICATION
The phase considers CSC system nodes that are vulnerable to
cyberattacks by integrating CTI and ML to obtain attack pre-
dictions of known and unknown attacks using three sequential
activities.
Activity 1: Determine Input Parameters
The input parameters mainly consider the attack and TTP
to demonstrate how the attackers penetrate a system. In par-
ticular, threat actors’ properties such as capability and attack
vector, tools are used for the input parameters.
• Step 1: Feature Selection: This step includes different
ML techniques to select the available features that exist
in the data. These feature selection techniques include
dimensionality reductions in large datasets for effective
and reliable training, testing and prediction. The features
we use for our prediction are malware, spyware, spear
phishing and Rootkit attacks.
• Step 2: Choosing a Classifier and Performance Metrics:
We classify the various algorithms such as LR, DT,
SVM and RF in VM to determine (1) the different
types of responses based on an attack and (2) differ-
ent types of response give the TTP deployed. For our
study, we use the binary classification as it supports
AUC-ROC in distinguishing between the probabilities
of the given classes. Further, its precisions can predict
correct instances, provides a harmonic mean of preci-
sion and recall for the F-score. Determining the right
performance metrics to evaluate the algorithms, influ-
ences the performance measures and how the algorithm
are compared with others. Not using the right metrics
could cause overfitting problems and impact on how we
evaluate our predictions.
Activity 2: Predict Threats
This activity aims to predicate vulnerabilities and IoC as
output feature. The vulnerabilities provide the organization
intelligence about areas that are exploitable and the IoC
provides the indicators of penetrations, cybercrimes com-
promises, APTs and C&Cs. Using the cyber threat analysis
and the inputs features, we use ML techniques and dataset
to predict the output features. The vulnerable spots include
network nodes, firewalls, antivirus and anti-malware. The IoC
includes the unknown attacks and the extent of cybercrime
manipulations, alteration, deletions, exfiltration and redirec-
tions that the threat actor could deploy on the system. The
stealthy nature of such attacks is so uncertain it cannot be
determined on the face value. This includes gathering various
attack probabilities and their propagation effects on the CSC
using ML techniques to train and test dataset to learn and to
gain accurate predictions. The process involves:
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• Applying ML techniques to learn the data events from
IDS/IPS and firewall logs to collect signatures, threat
indicators and, antimalware logs from the various supply
chain endpoints. TheML techniques consider LR, SVM,
DT, RF and MV algorithms to determine the accuracies
of our predictions.
• Determining false positives and false-negative rates.
• Analyse ML results, logs and alerts to understand the
attack trends as identified in the initial process to gather
intelligence as to what happened, how, why, when, who
and where the attack is initiated from.
Activity 3: Performance Evaluation
The performance of the models will be evaluated based
on the following values: True Positive (TP), True Negative
(TN), False Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN). Further,
the FP and FN will be determined based on the elements of
the confusion matrix. We follow the following steps for the
performance evaluation.
Step 1: Using Confusion Metrics to Determine TP and FP
Outcomes
A confusion matrix is a two-dimensional matrix that eval-
uates the performance of a classification model with respect
to a specific test dataset. It basically compares the actual
target values with those predicted by the machine learning
model. It provides a better understanding of the values by
calculating the data in the matrix and analyse them to deter-
mine any positive or negative classifications. Four outcomes
are determined when classifying the instances of the dataset.
These include True Positive (TP), True Negative (FP), False
Positive (FP) and False Negative (FN) rates. For instance,
in an event where an instance is positive, and the outcome is
classified as positive, its TP else its FP. Where the instance
is negative and the outcome is classified as negative, it is
counted as TN, else it is FN [15]. We consider the following
method to understand the confusion matrix. The accuracy of
the confusion metric is the proportion of the total number
of predictions that are considered as accurate. We use the
following equation below to determine the TPR, TNR, FPR,
FNR and the entropy.
AC =
TP+ TN
TP+ FP+ TN + FN
(1)
The recall or true positive rate (TPR) is the proportion






Finally, precision (P) is the proportion of the predicted






F-measure of F1 – Score (F) is used as the harmonic mean






Step 2: Determine Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Mean
Square Error (MSE)
MAE determines the sum of the absolute mean or normal
curve of the difference vector between predicted and real val-
ues.Whereas MSE determines themean or normal difference
by taking the absolute value of the square root of the mean
and convert the units back to the original unit of the output
variable and provide a gross idea of the magnitude of the
error. For us to predict real numbers or regressions, we used
MAE and MSE. The activities include Import AUC-ROC
Function, Import Mean Absolute Error, Import Mean Square
Error, and Set Entropy Criterion. Entropy is a concept used in
information theory to determine the measure of uncertainty
about the source of data. It is a unique function that satisfies
the four uncertainties axions in a confusion matrix and gives
us the degree of disorganization in our data. In an event
where a given set of data may contain random collections of
unstructured data, and entropy formula is used to separate the
positive and negative rates as follows:
Entrophy(E) = −a log2 a− b log2 b (5)
where a = Proportion of positive examples and b = Propor-
tion of negative examples. We use the formula to determine
the results in our experiment. We ask the following question
to derive the answer from the performance.
• TP = Did the model predicted correctly for the positive
class as positive?
• TN=Did the model predicted correctly for the negative
class as negative?
• FP = Did the model predicted incorrectly the negative
class as positive?
• FN = Did the model predicted incorrectly the positive
class as negative?
D. PHASE 4: CONTROL
This final phase aims to identify a list of controls that are to
tackle the threat. The controls should ensure that the required
security strategic and mechanism are put in place to mitigate
the threats. This includes identifying security requirements,
internal and external audit as well as threat monitoring and
reporting. The process includes identification and review of
existing controls, third-party audit and finally information
sharing.
VI. IMPLEMENTAION
This section follows the implementation of the proposed
approach to determine the applicability of our threat pre-
diction. We only follow threat identification, prediction, and
control phases for the implementation.
A. THREAT ANALYSIS
Threat analysis phase uses CTI approach to gather threat.
We identify vulnerabilities on the network nodes, IP address,
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IEDs and the threats that are linked to the organizational goal
that provide us with threat indicators. This includes the TTP
used by threat actors and their modes of operations. For our
analysis, we adopt the attack concepts and the properties from
the meta-model to determine the attack pattern and the TTP
deployed on the CSC. The phase involves gathering sources
of attacks, vulnerable spots, risks TTPs. Data are gathered
from firewalls logs, collecting a signature, threat indicators
and events from IDS/IPS, antimalware logs from the various
endpoints.
B. THREAT PREDICATION
Further to the discussion in Section 4, threat prediction
involves using ML techniques to learn dataset for threat pre-
dictions of known and unknown attacks. We follow the ML
process for our threat prediction.
1) DESCRIPTION OF DATA
We have considered the widely used dataset from aMicrosoft
Malware website for the implementation [6]. The dataset is
about malware attacks in the Microsoft endpoint system. The
data was collected byMicrosoftWindowsDefender with over
40,000 entries, with 64 columns and each row represents
different telemetry data entries. The data represents malware
attacks identified on various endpoint nodes from different
locations with machine identities, timestamps, organizational
identifier and default browser identifiers designed to meet
various business requirements. The rationale for using the
dataset is that the dataset does not represent Microsoft cus-
tomer’s machine only as it has been sampled to include
a much larger proportion of malware infection machines.
Therefore, we used this dataset for our predictive analytics
as CSC systems integrate various network infrastructures for
the business process and interoperability.
The feature description includes MachineIdentifier that
considers individual machine ID on the network, GeoNameI-
dentifier, provides IDs for the geographic region a machine
is located in. DefaultBrowsersIdentifier, provides ID for the
machine’s default browsers. OrganizationIdentifier, provides
ID for the organization the machine belongs in. Is protected,
provides a calculated field derived from the Spynet Report’s
AV Products field. Processor considers the process architec-
ture of the installed operating system. HasTpm, indicates true
if the machine has TPM (Trusted Platform Module). Over,
looks at the version of the current operating system. OsBuild,
information indicating the build of the current operating sys-
tem. Census_DeviceFamily AKA DeviceClass, indicates the
type of device that an edition of the OS is intended for desktop
and mobile. Firewall, this attribute is true (1) for Windows
8.1 and above if windows firewall is enabled, as reported by
the service [6].
2) DATA PREPARATION
The activity involves uploading the data from a website APIs
or an HTML file and selecting the data we need then save it
as CSV file. We prepare the data by converting the average
of the columns of the dataset. Furthermore, we loaded the
data from a pre-prepared dataset by calling the categories
of the machine learning identifier: The output generated
40,000 training datasets with 62 variables. Handling NaN
(Not a Number) in training set by using a command that
removes all the NaN in the training set into the dictionary and
prints the output. Furthermore, we create a NaN dictionary
to handle all the unwanted duplicate data. The output prints
62− 8 = 54. (8 columns removed).
3) FEATURE SELECTION
The main features are identified from the primary dataset
that are relevant to our work. There were 62 features in the
primary data and the focus is on the concepts of attacks,
tools and vulnerabilities from our previous work. We char-
acterized threat actor activities, including presumed intent
and historically observed behaviour, for the purpose of ascer-
taining the current threats that could be exploited. Further,
we identified eight vulnerable spots and their probability that
the cyber attacker could exploit those spots namely the: Fire-
wall, IDS/IPS, Vendors CSC system, Network, IP Addresses,
Database, Software, and Websites.
4) BUILDING NEW FEATURES INTO THE DATASET
The features considered as input parameters for the predic-
tions are the attack and TTP as discussed in Section 3.2.
To achieve that, we determine the types of attack, tools,
vectors, and capabilities for the input. we build the features
in line with the existing dataset feature description in [6].
Further, features for predicting the attack inputs and outputs
are identified by deriving new features that are in line with the
existing datasets and features [6] in Table 2. These features
and variables are related to the dataset for our work. Attack
patterns are an abstract mechanism for describing how a
type of observed attack is executed [32]. The output param-
eters are determined after our evaluation using the attack
pattern, TTPs, vulnerabilities as indicators of compromise.
Furthermore, the attack profiles for the ML prediction are
built-in dataset. The main goal of our work is to be able to
build attack profiles for our ML to predict which node is
vulnerable and likely to be attacked. We may not be able to
use exact features, but we consider characteristics that are
correlated with them and are relevant to represent how the
attacks are initiated and the vulnerabilities are exploited for
our future prediction. Hence, many features that we analysed
were chosen to represent the CTI and security awareness of
the stakeholders.
5) CHOOSING AN OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM FOR THE
CLASSIFIERS
For us to choose the classifiers as discussed in Section 4.1.3.
activity 1, step 2. we used a pipeline to connect the various
classifications. We use the 10-Fold cross-validation to deter-
mine the parameter estimation. The 10-Fold cross-validation
run and validate the parameter ten times on each algorithm
as the values may change and may not generate the accurate
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TABLE 1. Matrix to compute the accuracy, precision, recall and the
F-score.
result when we run it only ones. For the test, we used 10-fold
cross validation for more accurate predictive results. The
GridsearchCV provides an exhaustive search over specified
parameter values for an estimator. We combine all the four
algorithms usingMajority Voting (MV) algorithm in the clas-
sifiers to determine themean score of the total results. Finally,
we use ROC-AUC to distinguish between the accuracies of
the binary classification for the predictions [32].
6) EVALUATING THE ACCURACY OF THE THREATS
We consider the following method to understand the confu-
sion matrix as discussed in Section 5. The accuracy of the
confusion metrics is the proportion of the total number of pre-
dictions that are considered as accurate. Using the equation in
Section 5, we evaluate the accuracies (AC) of the metrics to




180+ 120+ 40+ 20
= 0.83 (6)
Using the Table 3, and the algorithm, we answer the fol-
lowing question to derive the values for the performances.
The False positive rate (FPR) determines the rate of negative
cases that were incorrectly classified as positive.
• FP = Did the model predicted incorrectly the negative





The result indicates that FPR of 0.25 negative cases were
incorrectly classified as positive. Whereas the true negative
rate (TNR) is defined as the number of negative cases that
were classified.






The result indicates TNR of 0.75 were the number of
negative cases that were classified as negative.
Further, the false negative rate (FNR) is the proposition of
positive cases that were incorrectly classified as negative.






The results indicate that the FNR of 0.1 was the proposition
of positive cases that were incorrectly classified as negative.
The recall or true positive rate (TPR) is the proportion of the
FIGURE 4. Plot the accuracy of all the algorithms in ROC curve for the LG,
DT, RF, and SVM in MV.
total number of correct predictions. We consider the equation
as:






The result indicates that the Recall or TPR of 0.9 was the
proportion of the total number of instances that were iden-
tified correctly from the positive classes. To predict positive
cases, we use precision (P) to determine the number of the






The final precision (P) of 0.81 was determined as the
proportion of the total number of positive instances that were
predicted correctly. The results show that the precision, recall
and F-Score used to determine the accuracy and precision of
the predictions are considered as accurate between the posi-
tive and negative rates. The result indicates that the F-Score
of 0.85 was the harmonic mean between precision and recall.
The Entropy is 0 if all member of E belongs to the same class,
or 1 if they have the same number of samples in each group.
The function entropy varies in range from 0 or 1.
7) ACCURACY OF THE ALGORITHMS IN ROC-AUC
Figure 4 depicts the ROC curve that determines the binary
classifier system that determines the thresholds of the algo-
rithms. We used AUC_ROC (Area Under Curve – Receiver
Operating Characteristics) to model the selection metric
for the bi-multiclass classification problem to distinguish
between the probabilities of the given classes. AUC_ROC
determines the True Positives Rates and False Negatives
Rates. We plot the accuracy of all the algorithms in ROC. A
10-fold cross validation was used to determine the accuracy
of the LR, DT, SVM and RF algorithms in the ROC. The
black, orange, blue and green colours represent the algo-
rithms. The x-axis represented as True Positive Rate and
y-axis as False Positive rate. We used a python script to plot
the graph as given in Figure 4:
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8) 10-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION
• [ROCAUC : 0.66 (+/− 0.02)LogisticRegression]
• ROCAUC : 0.63 (+/− 0.02) [DecisionTree]
• ROCAUC : 0.62 (+/− 0.02) [RandomForest]
• ROCAUC : 0.66 (+/− 0.02) [SVM ]
• ROCAUC : 0.67 (+/− 0.02) [MajorityVoting]
The results indicate that LG and SVMproduced the highest
results after we have used the ROC-AUC.
9) DETERMINING THE F-SCORE USING RECALL AND
PRECISION RATES
For us to determine the precision, recall, and F-score, we
answer the following questions regarding Table 1. Preci-
sion: how many positive instances were predicted correctly?
Recall: how many instances were identified correctly from
the positive classes? F-score: what is the harmonic mean
between precision and recall? Using the results from evalua-
tions in (I), we determine the F-Score and used the figures
from the recall (0.9) and precision (0.81) to calculate the
harmonic mean.
F =
2 ∗ 0.81 ∗ 0.9
0.81+ 0.91
= 0.85 (12)
10) INCORPORATING ML AND CASE STUDY FOR
EXPERIMENTATION
For us to determine the level of penetration, manipulation and
the probability of an attack. We used a case study scenario
of the remote CSC attack in [2] as below. The percentages
figures were determined using the formula for calculating
conditional probabilities in [2] from a low of 1 to a high
of 100. The percentage figures in the penetration list are used
for the result. The following is the scenario and the table
from [2].
11) SCENARIO 1. REMOTE ATTACK ON THE CSC SYSTEM
The organization security team found that an adversary had
intruded in the CSC system. The threat actor had com-
promised the workstation of the CMS that interfaced with
suppliers, distributors, and third-party vendors. The orga-
nization’s electronic products had been altered for some
time. The CMS generated inaccurate customer electricity
consumptions, which compromised the amount the customers
were paying for their utility bills, their online payments,
and third-party vendor systems. The organization used two
types of payment systems, the prepaid system and post-paid
system, that were all integrated into the CMS and HEMS.
Using the formula for calculating conditional probabilities [2]
and Activity 1 and Table 4, we determined the vulnerable
spots, the severities of manipulation in percentages, and
threat indicators. The percentages figures were calculated
using the formula for calculating conditional probabilities.
Further, the figures in penetration list are used to calcu-
late the precision, recall and F-Score in Section 6 for the
results.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents and analyses the results of the threat
prediction. We follow a number of assessment parameters
such as attack probability, TTP, vulnerable spots, and IoC for
this purpose. The attack probability figures are derived from
Table 2. The propagation is determined using a probability
scale of 0–100%. A percentage score was given after calcu-
lating the degree of severity of each manipulation. Form low
(≤15%), medium (16% to 59%), or high (above 60%).
• Prediction of an attack probability.
Table 3 presents the performance of the classifications of LR,
DT, SVM, RF algorithms in identifying the various responses
of cyberattacks based on the given malicious attack. From the
table, LR achieved an accuracy of 66%, DT, 63% SVM 62%
and RF 66%. Comparing the performance of the classifiers,
LR and RF both performed better for the Precision, Recall
and F-Score, whilst DT and SVM received a low precision,
recall and F-score. Comparing that to the attack’s categories
signifies that Malware, Ransomware and spyware attacks
identified different types of responses with 85% accuracy.
• Prediction of TTP deployed based on the response of the
cyberattacks.
Table 4 presents the performance of the classification
algorithms in identifying the various TTPs deployed, and
responses based on the given attack vectors. Comparing the
TTPs against the attack categories, XSS, session hijacking
and RAT attack, DT and SVM achieved a low content for
the low precision recall and F-score. However, LR received
the highest precision and F-score for malware attack with
83% accuracy for TTPs deployed. Furthermore, ransomware
and spyware attacks identified different types of responses
for the TTPs with 83% accuracy for the harmonic mean in
identifying the attack vectors being rootkit, email attachments
and RAT.
• Prediction of vulnerable spots based on the different
types of responses of cyberattacks
Table 5 presents the performance of the various classifica-
tions of the LR, DT, SVM and RF algorithms in identifying
the vulnerable spots based on the different types of responses
of cyberattacks. The vulnerable spots were identified from the
CSC system probable threats table in [2] and used the manip-
ulations figures for precision, recall and F-Score. LR and
RF achieved a similar accuracy of 87% for the precision
and F-score the successful attacks that signify the probability
of exploits on the network nodes. Further, attacks such as
malware and ransomware received higher precision based on
the exploits and TTPS deployed with 92% accuracy. Whilst
spear phishing, session hijacking and DDoS performs lower
with the DT and SVM classifiers.
• Predication of indicators of compromise (IoC).
Table 6 presents the performance variations of the various
classifications algorithms that identify what constitutes as
indicators of compromise. With DDoS attack, RF presented
the highest precision values of 83% compare to SVM indicat-
ing the extent of compromises on the network. LR received
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TABLE 2. Probability and threat indicators.
TABLE 3. Predict the probability of an attack from the various endpoints.
TABLE 4. Identify the different TTP deployed based on the response of the cyberattacks.
TABLE 5. Predict vulnerable spots based on the different types of responses of cyberattacks.
the highest precision and F-score for malware and spyware
attacks, whereas RF and LR received the similar precision,
recall and F-score.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS
The results for the predictive analytics are analysed
in AUC_ROC as indicated in Figure 4. A 10-Fold
cross-validation was used to run each algorithm to determine
the parameter estimation and validated the accuracies. The
evaluation of the accuracies of the metrics to answer the per-
formance of the TPR, TNR, FPR, FNR as shown in Table 3.
We determine the harmonic mean for the proportion of the
total number of accuracies for the precision, recall, and
F-score. The proportion for the precision is 220 for the
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TABLE 6. Indicators of compromise (IOC). FOR performance variations of the various classifications algorithms.
TABLE 7. Mapping the attack category and predictive analytics.
number of positive instances that were predicted correctly.
The proportion of recall (0.9) instances was identified cor-
rectly from the positive classes. The F-score of (0.85) was
the harmonic mean between precision and recall. Hence,
an accuracy of 85% is the total number of predictions that are
considered accurate for the TPR and FPR. Further, we have a
slight variation in our predictions of the TPF and FPR com-
paring the LR, DT, SVM, and RF algorithms in the pipeline
and using MV for running them. However, the accuracy of
the proportion of the total number of predictions remains
accurate with an average of 65% and 30% as the combine
values for the TPR and FPT respectively. Additionally, the
results indicate that LG and SVM produced the highest
results after we have used the ROC-AUC. The predictive
analysis of our evaluation after we have used the CTI to
gather information, gain knowledge and understanding of the
organizational context and the situational awareness remains
acceptable as compared to other literature that focused on
ML only for predictions. The Table 7 shows the list the attack
categories and threat predictions.
Table 6 combines the probability of attacks identified from
previous work and map them with the feature descriptions of
the threats to explains the predictive analytics [2]. The map-
ping includes attack categories, CSC attack features, and the
threat describes for probable cause of attacks from the teleme-
try data and Microsoft endpoint protection threat report for
the predictions. The attack categories were determined from
the dataset of various threat descriptions from the telemetry
data [23] that contains the properties of the various families
of malware generated by the Windows defenders. The CSC
attack features were derived from the various families of
malware that has the probability of infecting the various
CSC endpoint nodes. The threat descriptions were gathered
by the threat report collected by the Microsoft Windows
Defender [23]. The results specify that spyware/ransomware
scored 90%. All the attack categories that score 80% indi-
cated that an XSS or session hijacking could be deployed
on the CSC website as uses public facing IPs it connects to
various vendors. These could lead to spear phishing, rootkit
and DDoS attacks. The rest of the threat prediction scores are
explained in Table 7.
The paper reveals several observations made from the
CSC attacks to using CTI lifecycle processes for intelligence
gatherings, and ML for predictive analysis for the overall
Smart CPS security improvement. The study revealed that
several challenges are facing the organization in securing
their systems as attackers are executing arbitrary commands
on the supply chain systems remotely and manipulating
systems.
A. MAPPING CYBERATTACKS ON CSC FOR PREDICTIVE
ANALYTICS OF INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
Table 8 provides details of how we mapped the cyberattacks
on the CSC system for predictive analytics to determine
the indicators of compromise. We used the threat modelling
concepts in Section 3, and the properties to identify the
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TABLE 8. Output parameters for indicators of compromise.
TABLE 9. CSC security controls.
cyberattack, the attack pattern that were used, the vulnerable
spots that were exploited, and the TTPs that are deployed by
the threat actor on the CSC systems as the indicators of com-
promise (IoC). Indicators of compromise are parameters used
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to express whether an attack-type is imminent, in progress or
has occurred. Refer [2] further reading on threat modelling.
Threat actors use sophisticated and stealthy methods to inject
a virus, worms, bugs or a Trojan into software or in an
HTTP request in an ‘Island Hopping’ attack. The intent is to
penetrate the network or gain access to the webserver when a
request is being processed. Themotive could be tomanipulate
the vulnerable spots, alter the software and delivery channels
and maintain APT and command & control presence.
Using the C&C methods, the attacker can modify products
during manufacturing, manipulate it during distributions and
the various domain attacks. These attacks could cascade to
other nodes on the supply inbound and outbound chains.
The table below provides a matrix that blends the input and
output parameters for the prediction. Our observation is that
the following vulnerabilities exist in the cyber supply chain
system:
• The supply chain variables are accessible to the threat
actor due to the business applications used for the supply
chain variables and that could be exploited using incor-
rect user data.
• Information retrieved through inputted data is not con-
figured properly due to poor validation.
• The variables are not well encapsulated to prevent soft-
ware redirect. For instance, setting an input variable as
public in a class when developing the software source
codes makes the website open to external attackers.
B. MACHINE LEARNING FOR PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS
Machine learning approach to cybersecurity has been effec-
tive in analyzing and predicting future attacks and attack
trends. We use ML techniques and classification algorithms
including LD, SVM, DT, RF, and MV to develop threat
intelligence techniques that can predict which nodes on our
CSC system are venerable to attacks. We plot the accuracy
of all the algorithms in ROC. AUC_ROC to determine the
true positives and true negative rates. The results show that
the best parameter result was SVM with an accuracy of 0.66.
ML provides us with the ability to combine algorithms to
determine which of them produced the highest accuracy and
output for the best parameter for our prediction. However,
it does not provide us with the ability to understand the threat
actor’s motives and intents.
C. COMPARING RESULTS WITH EXISTING WORKS
A stated in the related works, there have a lot of attention of
using ML classifiers for cyber security. A vector space model
is used for information retrieval for HTTP attacks using a
decision tree algorithm to automatically label the request
as malicious in the URL[11]. A number of classification
algorithms LR, DT, NB, and SVM are considered for cloud
security and tested the models in diverse operational condi-
tions using cloud security scenarios[20]. Further, [21] used
data mining and ML methods on Artificial Neural Network,
Association rules, Fuzzy Association rules and Bayesian
Networks classifiers for cybersecurity detection and analytics
in intrusion detection security applications. Furthermore, [22]
comparedML datasets used for analyzing network traffic and
anomaly detection relevant for modern intrusion detections
datasets. Moreover, [23], explored the classification of logs
using a decision tree algorithm that models the correlation
and normalization of security logs. Similarly, [24] compared
NNge. LF, DT, Naïve Bayes, and SVM classification algo-
rithms performance and ML predictions for power system
disturbance and cyberattack discriminations. Then, [25] used
an instance-based learning classification algorithm to learn
a dataset for feature reduction and detection techniques to
detect cyberattacks on smart grid. Additionally, [26] used
an ensembled learning model based on the combination of
a random subspace with random tree to detect cyberattacks
on Industrial IoT networks. Likewise, [28] explored miti-
gating techniques on IoT cybersecurity threats in a smart
city by using ML techniques to learn dataset on LR, SVM,
DT, RF, ANN and KNN classifiers for anomaly detections.
Further, [29] proposed a novel adaptive trust boundary pro-
tection for Industrial IoT network by using deep learning on
a semi supervised model for detecting unknown cyberattacks.
Furthermore, [30] used deep neural network discriminator on
a down sample encoder cooperative data generator train the
algorithm to capture actual distribution of attack model on
industrial IoT attack surface. Additionally, authors in [31]
predicted cybersecurity incidents by using Naive Bayes and
SVM algorithms to investigate and analyse various datasets
collected from SMEs. Finally, [32] model a risk teller system
that used ML to predict which machines are at risk of getting
infected or are clean and forecast if an organization may
experience cybersecurity incidents in the future. Though all
the works are relevant and contribute for the cyber security
improvement. However, there is a lack of focus on the overall
CSC security and ML classifiers are mainly used datasets
for the threat predication. The proposed work presents a
conceptual view by integrating relevant concepts from CSC
and CTI domain. It provides a systematic threat analysis
using the CTI techniques and integrates ML classifiers for
the threat predication. Additionally, we considered LG, DT,
SVM, RF algorithms in Majority Voting to learn the malware
threat prediction dataset.
D. CSC SECURITY CONTROLS
There are various security controls in existence, whose effec-
tiveness are based on existing CSC attacks and risks including
CIS Controls 2018 and ISO27002:2011. We recommend the
approach to address the CSC security using threat intelli-
gence gathered from known and unknown attacks in line
with organizational objectives and provide security recom-
mendations. Some organizations provide a recommendation,
however, not all may be relevant to the cyber supply chain
organizational objective. Table 9 identifies basic concepts
that are required to maintain security controls in the supply
chain environment. To incorporate cybersecurity controls into
a cyber supply chain system, we use knowledge of actual
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CSC attacks that have occurred in the past. A compromised
supply chain system provides us with the knowledge of pre-
vious attacks to continually learn from and build effective
and practical defences mechanisms. To ensure proper CSC
security controls, the organization must form a strategic team
to identify, investigate, review and evaluate the supply chain
system processes and applications.
E. THREAT INFORMATION SHARING
Threat information sharing is essential for any cyber physical
system and specifically for the CSC context. It helps sup-
ply chain organisations and its stakeholders to aware about
the current threat trends so that appropriate control can be
identified to tackle the attacks. The CTI information includes
threat landscapes, TTPs, tools, and intelligence reports. The
threat intelligence is shared amongst the various organiza-
tions, institutions, vendors and businesses on the CSC sys-
tem for strategic management decision making. It designates
information and creates situational awareness on the various
security alerts, assess and monitor threats, risk and existing
controls. Due to the sensitive nature of the intelligence and
privacy rules, these organizations are required to sign an
agreement to ensure the following:
• Establish Information sharing rules
• Establish security system and audit rules
• Establish rules that govern the sharing of sensitive infor-
mation
• Establish information classification rules. (Need to
Know)
Challenges facing information sharing include the sensitivity
nature of cyberattacks and the fact that it could lead to rep-
utational damage, and sometimes legal ramifications. Most
organizations are reluctant to share information relevant to
CSC security.
IX. CONCLUSION
The integration of complex cyber physical infrastructures
and applications in a CSC environment have brought eco-
nomic, business, and societal impact for both national and
global context in the areas of Transport, Energy, Healthcare,
Manufacturing, and Communication. However, CPS security
remains a challenge as vulnerability from any part of the
system can pose risk within the overall supply chain context.
This paper aims to improve CSC security by integrating CTI
andML for the threat analysis and predication.We considered
the necessary concepts from CSC and CTI and a systematic
process to analyse and predicate the threat. The experimental
results showed that accuracies of the LG, DT, SVM, and
RF algorithms in Majority Voting and identified a list of
predicated threats. We also observed that CTI is effective
to extract threat information, which can integrate into the
ML classifiers for the threat predication. This allows CSC
organization to analyse the existing controls and determine
additional controls for the improvement of overall cyber secu-
rity. It is necessary to consider the full automation of the
process and industrial case study to generalize our findings.
Furthermore, we are also planning to consider evaluating the
existing controls and the necessary of future controls based
on our prediction results.
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